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Thrown Under the Bus: Victims of
Workplace Discrimination After Harris
By DAVID W. FUJIMOTO*
Introduction
A JURY OF THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT CONCLUDED
that the City of Santa Monica (“City”) violated the prohibition on sex
discrimination in the Fair Employment Housing Act (“FEHA”)1 by dis-
criminating against one of their bus drivers, Wynonna Harris, on the
basis of sex when they fired her in May of 2005.2 The court of appeal
reversed the judgment,3 and in Harris v. City of Santa Monica,4 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal.5
The California Supreme Court (1) raised the standard of causation
that plaintiffs alleging any form of employment discrimination must
meet,6 (2) established the same-decision defense for mixed-motive
cases, which allows employers to significantly mitigate exposure to
damages if it can show it would have made the same decision absent
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1. California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West
2006 & Supp. 2011).
2. Harris v. Santa Monica (Harris II), 294 P.3d 49, 51 (Cal. 2013).
3. Harris v. Santa Monica (Harris I), 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
4. 294 P.3d 49.
5. Id. at 51 (modifying the remand instructions of the court of appeal).
6. See id. at 66 (requiring the jury to find not just the existence of an impermissible
motivation for termination, but also that such motivation was “substantial”).
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discrimination,7 and (3) opened the door to use of the stray remarks
doctrine.8
While Harris was a sex discrimination case, the broadly worded
decision will impact all protected employees who allege disparate
treatment. In the context of race, has history reached a point where
discrimination is so infrequent that California should weaken the de-
terrence and remedial mechanisms of FEHA? Are plaintiffs in discrim-
ination cases inappropriately taking advantage of FEHA to the extent
that the standard of causation should be raised? And should courts
disregard as evidence statements that clearly indicate bias merely be-
cause they were not made at the time of the adverse action? The re-
search suggests that race-based discrimination is still a significant
problem, and, contrary to popular belief, that discrimination plaintiffs
struggle in the courts.
Americans experience race-based workplace discrimination in
numbers that do not demonstrate any improvement over the past
twelve years.9 Most African Americans believe they are less likely than
whites to get jobs in their communities.10 Unconscious biases11 “and
perceptions about African Americans still play a significant role in em-
ployment decisions in the federal sector.”12 African Americans with
dark or medium skin earn ten to fifteen percent less than whites.13
Light-skinned immigrants earn eight to fifteen percent more than
similar immigrants with dark skin.14 Minorities are overrepresented in
service jobs while whites are overrepresented in managerial and exec-
7. Id. at 51.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See Race-Based Charges FY 1997 – FY 2012, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statis-
tics/enforcement/race.cfm (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (showing that charges of race-based
discrimination have mostly stayed the same or increased from 1997 to 2012); Race-Based
Harassment Charges FY 1997 – FY 2012, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/en-
forcement/race_harassment.cfm (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (showing that charges of race-
based harassment have mostly stayed the same or increased from 1997 to 2012).
10. Poll on Race Relations, GALLUP 3, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1687/race-relations.
aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
11. See generally Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing remedies for addressing
unconscious racism in equal protection problems).
12. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC AFRICAN AMERICAN WORKGROUP
REPORT 2 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/reports/upload/African-Amer-
ican-Report.pdf.
13. Eva Paterson et al., The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection in the 21st Century, 40 CONN.
L. REV. 1175, 1184 (2008) (citing Travis Loller, Study Says Skin Tone Affects Earnings, USA
TODAY (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/income/2007-01-26-
skin-tone-study_x.htm).
14. Id.
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utive positions.15 And if one is a firefighter who is Asian,16 Latino,17 or
African American,18 one’s chances of being hired and then working
without experiencing race-based discrimination is slim.
Despite the continued prevalence of discrimination in the work-
place, plaintiffs in discrimination cases face difficult odds.19 In federal
district courts, employment discrimination plaintiffs bring fewer cases
15. 2012 Job Patterns for Minorities and Women in Private Industry (EEO-1), EEOC, http://
www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/employment/jobpat-eeo1/2012/index.cfm#select_label
(select “National Aggregate, All Industries” and press “Go”) (last visited Nov. 1, 2013)
[hereinafter 2012 Job Patterns] (showing that—while making up 65% of private sector em-
ployees—whites comprise 79% of first- or mid-level managers and 88% of executive- or
senior-level officials and managers, and that—while consisting of 35% of private sector
employees—minorities comprise 21% of first- or mid-level managers, nearly 12% of execu-
tive- or senior-level officials and managers, and 51% of service workers).
16. See Chris Vogel, Alhambra Arson Foul Play?, L.A. WEEKLY (July 7, 2011), available at
http://www.laweekly.com/2011-07-07/news/alhambra-arson-foul-play/2/ (“As only one of
two Asians in the fire department—the other being Vietnamese—Toh never felt at ease
among the mostly white and Hispanic firefighters, and says he was often the butt of their
jokes.”); Susan Edelman, FDNY EMS Lt. Spews Racist, Anti-Semitic Tweets, but Cried When Con-
fronted, N.Y. POST (Mar. 24, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/03/24/fdny-ems-lt-spews-ra-
cist-anti-semitic-tweets-but-cried-when-confronted/ (“[An EMS lieutenant who posted
numerous racist tweets is] a symptom of a sick system. If you work in the city [of New York]
for police, fire or EMS and tell me you’re surprised by this, you’re a liar.”) (quoting a
retired EMS veteran). But see AnnMarie Costella, Asian Firefighters See No Racism in FDNY,
QUEENS CHRON. (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.qchron.com/editions/queenswide/asian-
firefighters-see-no-racism-in-the-fdny/article_b00166b3-d682-5d97-bb36-30188d2ff64e.html
(describing two Asian American FDNY firefighters who, despite knowing that Asian Ameri-
cans make up the smallest percentage of all minority groups in the FDNY, believe there is
no racism in the department).
17. See Hal Budnick, Smoking out Racism in the FDNY: The Dwindling Use of Race-Con-
scious Hiring Remedies, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1249, 1263–64 (2012) (summarizing the history of
race discrimination against African Americans and Latinos in the FDNY); Ann C. McGin-
ley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581, 588–92
(2010) (tracing the history of underrepresentation of African Americans and Latinos in
the New Haven Fire Department and the FDNY); New Allegations of Racism at HFD, ABC
LOCAL (Jan. 24, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local&id=
7915748 (reporting on a Latino firefighter’s allegations that he had found his gear hang-
ing by a noose with a sign that said “Learn your f’in job Mexican. Be Glad you’re not in
Arizona”).
18. See Budnick supra note 17; McGinley, supra note 17 (tracing the history of under-
representation of African Americans and Latinos in the New Haven Fire Department and
the FDNY); Jaxon Van Derbeken, Tentative Settlement in Black SF Firefighter’s Suit, S.F. GATE
(Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Tentative-settlement-in-black-SF-
firefighter-s-4795725.php (detailing a black firefighter’s allegations that he was referred to
as a house boy and relegated to hard labor instead of training for a year); Paul H.B., Out-
rage over Racist Parade Queens Float Mocks Tex. Slay, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 10, 1998), http://
www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/outrage-racist-parade-queens-float-mocks-tex-slay-ar-
ticle-1.816537 (reporting on the participation of New York firefighters in a parade featur-
ing floats depicting African Americans in an offensive manner).
19. Katie R. Eyes, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrim-
ination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1282–83 (citing Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
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now than in previous years.20 Employment cases proceed and termi-
nate less favorably for plaintiffs than in other civil cases.21 Even in
California, where employment discrimination laws are viewed as
stronger than federal laws, women and minorities do not fare as well
in discrimination cases as plaintiffs in other employment termination
cases.22 While cases tend to settle, they do not settle more often than
other civil cases.23 Rather than plaintiffs easily prevailing in discrimi-
nation cases, the statistics show the opposite. As opposed to the exis-
tence of runaway juries awarding high damages, “employment
discrimination cases are hard to win, and usually result in rather mod-
est verdicts.”24
The ascent of President Barack Obama to the White House has
fed the widely held belief that the significance of race in America has
dissipated.25 There is public consensus that race no longer matters.26
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 429, 429 (2004)).
20. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Fed-
eral Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 117–18 (2009) (attributing the
“very significant downturn in filings since 1998” to the “largely negative experiences of
many plaintiffs and their lawyers” as opposed to a decrease in discrimination).
21. See id. at 127.
22. See David B. Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employ-
ment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Verdicts Reveal Low Success Rates for Women and
Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 548–49 (2003).
In race discrimination cases brought by non-whites . . . the plaintiffs won only
36% of the time. In race discrimination cases brought by non-whites involving
allegations other than harassment, plaintiffs won only 33% of the time. In the
four race discrimination cases brought by whites, the plaintiffs won 100% of the
time. . . . In termination cases generally, plaintiffs won 46% of the verdicts, but in
race discrimination termination cases filed by non-whites, plaintiffs won only 16%
of the time, including three of twelve (25%) for black plaintiffs. In sex discrimina-
tion termination cases filed by women, plaintiffs won only 25% of the time. . . . At
the intersection of sex and race, in cases brought by black women alleging either
sex discrimination and/or race discrimination, plaintiffs won only 17% of the
time. . . . At the intersection of sex and age, women alleging age discrimination
lost every case they tried, while men alleging age discrimination won 36% of the
time.
Id.
23. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 20, at 121. This demonstrates that the asser-
tion that employees take unfair advantage of employers by suing for discrimination and
then settling for large settlements is not supported by statistics on the rate of settlements.
See id.
24. See Oppenheimer, supra note 22, at 566.
25. See Ian F. Haney Lo´pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarcera-
tion in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2010) (“The election of Barack Obama
to the presidency has inspired many to marvel at the seeming evaporation of race as a basis
for social ordering in the United States, a euphoria often expressed in proclamations that
we now live in a ‘post-racial’ America.”) (citing Hua Hsu, The End of White America?, ATLAN-
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This false notion of colorblindness, or post-racialism, further exacer-
bates the problems plaintiffs face in race discrimination cases. Many
courts and juries start from the assumption that race discrimination is
absent.27
The idea that one’s perception about discrimination is influ-
enced by one’s relative position in society has been the subject of
much study. For example, Professor Roy Brooks has observed, “the law
legitimizes the ‘perpetrator’s’ or ‘insider’s’ perspective and is con-
structed by the dominant group to serve its own purpose.”28 Professor
Russell K. Robinson has further developed the idea of insider and out-
sider perspectives into “perceptual segregation theory,”29 which ac-
counts for differences in how insiders and outsiders perceive
discrimination.30 Robinson defines insiders as members of the domi-
nant class such as whites and men,31 and outsiders as members of the
minority class such as people of color and women.32 Whites are likely
to exhibit a colorblind perspective that assumes most whites are color-
blind while blacks tend to adopt a “pervasive prejudice perspective” in
which “racism is common and structural.”33 There are similar34 differ-
ences between men and women in how both groups perceive gender
discrimination.35
TIC ONLINE (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/01/the-
end-of-white-america/7208/); Tim Rutten, The Good Generation Gap, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2008, at 31 (suggesting that Obama “personifies and articulates the post-racial America in
which most of our young people now live”); Peter J. Boyer, The Political Scene: The Color of
Politics, NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2008, at 38 (promoting Obama, among others, as black politi-
cians who have transcended race).
26. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 11–12 (rev. ed. 2012).
27. See Theresa M. Beiner, Shift Happens: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Shifting Antidis-
crimination Rhetoric, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 37, 38 (2010); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segrega-
tion, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1126 (2008) (defining the “colorblindness perspective” as
the white person’s belief that “most white people are colorblind, and deviations from this
norm are unusual.”).
28. See Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal
Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 96 (1994).




33. Id. at 1126.
34. Russell Robinson explains that there are significant differences in how men and
women perceive gender discrimination, especially sexual harassment, but notes that the
differences appear to be more modest than racial differences. Id. at 1113.
35. Id.
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The recent California Supreme Court decision in Harris reflects
an insider perspective.36 The court impaired the ability of FEHA to
effectuate its purposes by (1) raising the standard of causation in
mixed-motive cases to substantial motivating factor,37 (2) permitting
employers to significantly limit their liability if they can make the illu-
sory showing that they would have made the same decision absent dis-
crimination,38 and (3) reviving the stray remarks doctrine.39 Harris is
largely premised on assumptions that ignore and minimize the exper-
iences and perspectives of outsiders.40 The court legitimizes the per-
spective of the insider by favoring certain doctrines, emphasizing
specific facts, and minimizing the impacts of discrimination. While
Harris is a sex discrimination case, it applies to any plaintiff claiming
disparate treatment under FEHA.41
This Note argues that the California Legislature should amend
FEHA to restore the motivating factor standard in mixed-motive cases,
reject the same decision defense, and reject the stray remarks doc-
trine. These changes will ensure that FEHA is more effective in achiev-
ing its purposes. Part I examines pre-Harris FEHA disparate treatment
jurisprudence in California. Part II looks at how the court arrived at its
decision in Harris for mixed-motive claims. Part III evaluates Harris
from a critical race perspective and shows how the Court improperly
allowed the insider perspective to dominate over the outsider perspec-
tive by focusing on certain facts and doctrines to achieve its results,
minimizing the impacts of discrimination, and favoring a policy of
preventing the unjust enrichment of employees over giving a free pass
to employers who discriminate. Part IV examines how Harris is incon-
sistent with our contemporary knowledge of discrimination and takes
us backwards in the ability of FEHA to achieve its purposes. Part V
offers recommendations to the Legislature on how to address the re-
sulting inequities and further marginalization Harris will have on
employees.
36. See Harris II, 294 P.3d 49 (Cal. 2013).
37. See infra Part IV.B.
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. See infra Part III.B.
40. See infra Part III.A–C, IV.A.
41. E.g., Mounts v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections and Rehabilitation, No. F064225, 2013
WL 3815593, at *3–4 (Cal Ct. App. July 22, 2013) (citing Harris in reversing and remanding
for a new trial a race discrimination FEHA case because of the trial court’s failure to pro-
vide a mixed-motive jury instruction).
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I. Pre-Harris FEHA Jurisprudence
FEHA prohibits employers from discriminating against employ-
ees “because of” protected characteristics.42 The legislature has found
that the denial of employment opportunities on the basis of protected
characteristics “foments domestic strife and unrest, deprives the state
of the fullest utilization of its capacities for development and advance-
ment, and substantially and adversely affects the interests of employ-
ees, employers, and the public . . . .”43 The purpose of FEHA is to
eliminate discrimination by providing “effective remedies that will
prevent and deter unlawful practices and redress the adverse effects of
those practices on aggrieved persons.”44 FEHA “shall be construed lib-
erally for the accomplishment of [its] purposes.”45
Cases where the plaintiff alleges she suffered an adverse employ-
ment action because of a protected characteristic—disparate treat-
ment cases46—generally fall into one of two categories: single-motive
or mixed-motive cases. Single-motive cases involve one alleged motiva-
tion for the adverse employment action: either discriminatory or legit-
imate.47 Mixed-motive cases involve potentially both discriminatory
and legitimate reasons for an adverse employment action.48
On motion for summary judgment for single-motive FEHA cases,
the California Supreme Court has adopted the three-stage burden-
shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green49 by the
United States Supreme Court.50 Under this framework, the plaintiff
has the initial burden of making a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.51 A prima facie case establishes a presumption of discrimina-
42. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (prohibiting discrimination
“because of the [employee’s] race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical
disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex,




46. Green v. State, 165 P.3d 118, 131 (Cal. 2007).
47. See Harris II, 294 P.3d 49, 53–54 (Cal. 2013).
48. See id. at 54.
49. 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (interpreting Title VII cases).
50. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 54; see also Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (Cal.
2000). Title VII, the federal anti-discrimination statute, makes it unlawful for an employer
“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
51. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1113 (“[T]he plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) he was a
member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was per-
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tion.52 Next, if the plaintiff makes his prima facie case, the employer
must rebut the presumption by producing evidence its action was
taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.53 Finally, if the em-
ployer meets its burden of production,54 the plaintiff must show the
employer’s proffered reason was pretext for discrimination, and the
plaintiff may offer additional evidence of discriminatory motive.55 Ul-
timately, the plaintiff has the burden of persuading the trier of fact of
unlawful discrimination.56
In pre-Harris mixed-motive FEHA cases, California appellate
courts have utilized different approaches. Some accounted for the
possibility of mixed-motives within the McDonnell Douglas framework.57
For example, mixed-motives for an adverse action have been analyzed
as a part of the third prong—employer pretext—of the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework.58 Some courts refused to enter-
tain the argument that there were mixed-motives by holding either
forming competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment ac-
tion, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other
circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.”).
52. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 54.
53. Id.
54. The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1114. The defen-
dant’s burden of production is met if it produces admissible evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of fact, which is enough to rebut the presumption that arises from the plain-
tiff’s prima facie showing. Id. (italics added).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Mixon v. Fair Emp’t Hous. Comm’n, 237 Cal. Rptr. 884, 891 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987) (stating that a plaintiff “need not prove that racial animus was the sole motiva-
tion behind the challenged action”); Caldwell v. Paramount Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 448, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that once a case gets to the jury, “the
intermediate burdens set forth in McDonnell Douglas will fall away, and the factfinder will
have only to decide the ultimate issue of whether the employer’s discriminatory intent was
a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision”); Marks v. Loral, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d
1, 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), superseded by statute, Act of August 2, 1999, ch. 222, § 2, 1999 Cal.
Stat. 2189, 2190–91, (codified as amended at CAL GOV’T CODE § 12941 (West 2006)) (hold-
ing that it was not an error for the trial court to refuse an express mixed-motive instruction
since a “portion of the instruction which the trial court did give to the jury told its members
that plaintiff could prevail if ‘age played a motivating part’ (our emphasis) in a decision, so
[plaintiff] can hardly complain that the court precluded him from informing the jury that
if his employer had a bad reason and a good reason, he should win”).
58. See, e.g., Clark v. Claremont Univ. Ctr., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(“[W]hile a complainant need not prove that racial animus was the sole motivation behind
the challenged action, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a
‘causal connection’ between the employee’s protected status and the adverse employment
decision.” (quoting Mixon, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 891)).
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the facts did not warrant it,59 that the case was litigated and argued as
a single-motive case,60 or by disposing of the case on other grounds.61
Other courts looked to the approach taken by federal courts in-
terpreting mixed-motive cases under Title VII. Some appellate courts
analyzed cases under the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins62 framework.63 In
this framework, also known as the same-decision defense, “once a
plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that [membership in a protected
class] played a motivating part in an employment decision,”64 the em-
ployer may avoid liability by proving by a “preponderance of the evi-
dence”65 it would have made the same decision absent the
discriminatory motive.66 Lastly, there are cases in which courts im-
plied in dicta they would allow employers to mitigate liability under
the Price Waterhouse framework should they be confronted with a
mixed-motive case.67
Before Harris there were different approaches to analyzing
mixed-motive cases. While all appellate courts required that plaintiffs
show discrimination was a motivating factor, they differed on whether
they permitted a same-decision defense, or accounted for mixed mo-
tives as a part of the ultimate question in step three of McDonnell
Douglas.
59. See, e.g., Alamo v. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155, 165 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2012); Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(“[B]ecause the evidence does not support [plaintiff’s] contention that [defendant] had
legitimate and illegitimate reasons for his termination, we do not decide whether a mixed-
motive analysis applies under FEHA or in this case.”).
60. See, e.g., Huffman v. Interstate Brands Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 416 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004).
61. Veronese v. Lucasfilm Ltd., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 41, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“We
deem it unnecessary to weigh in on the [mixed-motive] issue, for even if the giving of CACI
2500 is held to be proper under California law, reversal would be required due to errors in
other instructions—errors, we conclude, that were prejudicial.”).
62. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
63. See, e.g., Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), overruled
on other grounds by Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993); Harvey v. Sybase, Inc.,
76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
64. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244.
65. Id. at 253.
66. Id. at 244–45.
67. See, e.g., Huffman v. Interstate Brands Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 416 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (citing Price Waterhouse in its discussion regarding mixed motives); Grant-Burton v.
Covenant Care, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 219–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding there is no
liability if a defendant with an improper motive for termination can show it still would have
terminated an employee regardless of the improper motive); Heard v. Lockhead Missiles &
Space Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Price Waterhouse in its
discussion on mixed motives, although case was ultimately decided using a McDonnell Doug-
las analysis).
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II. Harris v. Santa Monica
Harris v. Santa Monica was a gender discrimination case that pro-
vided a major opportunity for the California Supreme Court to clarify
and advance the underlying goals of FEHA.68 The court resolved the
question of how to analyze mixed-motive cases by: (1) holding that
discrimination must be a substantial motivating factor69 and (2) adopt-
ing the same-decision defense to eliminate compensatory and punitive
damages as well as reinstatement.70
A. Court’s Recitation of the Facts and Procedural History
Wynona Harris was hired by the City of Santa Monica as a bus
driver trainee in October of 2004.71 During her training period, she
was involved in what was considered to be a preventable accident.72
During her probationary period, she was involved in another
accident.73
In March of 2005, Harris received a performance evaluation cov-
ering her first three months (November through February) as a pro-
bationary employee.74 The overall evaluation indicated, “further
development needed.”75
Over the course of her probationary period, she had two miss-
outs which are defined in the job performance guidelines “as a
driver’s failure to give her supervisor at least one hour’s warning that
she will not be reporting for her assigned shift.”76 The guidelines pro-
vide “that a miss-out would result in 25 demerit points and that
‘[p]robationary employees are allowed’” fifty points.77 Of Importance,
her second miss-out, on April 27, 2005, caused her to reach fifty de-
merit points. This miss-out was due to Harris’s attendance at her
daughter’s juvenile court proceeding.78 Distressed from the hearing,
Harris forgot to notify her dispatcher she would be late.79
68. See infra Part II.A.
69. See infra Part II.B.
70. See infra Part II.C.
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On May 12, 2005, Harris had an encounter with her supervisor,
George Reynoso, in which he told Harris to tuck in her shirt which
was hanging loose.80 She responded by informing Reynoso she was
pregnant.81 Reynoso reacted with apparent “displeasure at her news,
exclaiming: ‘Wow. Well, what are you going to do? How far along are
you?’”82 He then requested a doctor’s note clearing her for work.83
Four days later, Harris supplied the requested doctor’s note, which
permitted her to work with limited restrictions.84 Two days after Har-
ris submitted the doctor’s note, she was fired.85
Harris “alleged that she was fired by the City . . . because of her
pregnancy in violation of the prohibition on sex discrimination in
the” FEHA.86 The City answered that Harris was fired for “one or
more legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons,” none of which was a pre-
text for discrimination.87
Harris and the City disagreed over the appropriate mixed-motive
jury instruction.88 Ultimately, the trial court denied the City’s pro-
posed BAJI No. 12.2689 same-decision jury instruction,90 modeled af-
ter the Price Waterhouse approach.91 Instead, the court instructed the
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 52–53.
83. Id. at 53.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 51.
87. Id. at 71.
88. Id. at 53.
89. CAL. JURY INST. — CIVIL 12.26 (2010); Harris II, 294 P.3d at 53.
90. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 53 (quoting CAL. JURY INST. — CIVIL 12.26).
The instruction states: If you find that the employer’s action, which is the subject
of plaintiff’s claim, was actually motivated by both discriminatory and non-dis-
criminatory reasons, the employer is not liable if it can establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that its legitimate reason, standing alone, would have
induced it to make the same decision.
An employer may not, however, prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a legit-
imate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not motivate it at the
time of the decision. Neither may an employer meet its burden by merely show-
ing that at the time of the decision it was motivated only in part by a legitimate
reason. The essential premise of this defense is that a legitimate reason was pre-
sent, and standing alone, would have induced the employer to make the same
decision.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
91. Compare id., with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989) (“[O]nce
a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that [a protected characteristic] played a motivating
part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by
proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed [the pro-
tected characteristic] to play such a role.”).
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jury under CACI 2500,92 the standard California disparate treatment
instruction,93 and BAJI 12.01.1, which defines motivating factor, pro-
vided for by the 1991 amendments to Title VII, as “something that
moves the will and induces action even though other matters may
have contributed to the taking of the action.”94 Together, the instruc-
tions provided that Harris bore the burden to prove her pregnancy
“was a motivating factor/reason for the discharge.”95 This instruction
directed the jury to evaluate at step three of the McDonnell Douglas
framework whether discrimination was a motivating factor. The jury
found the City terminated Harris because of sex discrimination and
awarded $177,905 in damages, of which $150,000 was for mental
suffering.96
The Court of Appeal, relying on previous appellate cases and fed-
eral law interpreting Title VII, held the City’s proposed BAJI No.
12.26 instruction was a proper statement of California law and refusal
by the trial court to give it was prejudicial error.97 Since the court of
appeals also determined there was substantial evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find for Harris, the case was remanded for new
trial.98 The California Supreme Court granted Harris’s petition for
review.99
B. California Supreme Court Declares that Discrimination Must be
a Substantial Motivating Factor in Mixed-Motive Cases
The California Supreme Court first needed to determine what it
meant to discriminate “because of” a person’s protected class under
section 12940(a) of FEHA.100 Looking at the plain language of
FEHA,101 the court identified three possible interpretations:102 First,
92. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 53.
93. CAL. CIV. JURY INSTR. NO. 2500, DIRECTIONS FOR USE, at 1322 (Judicial Council of
Cal. 2013), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/caci_2013_edition.
pdf (“This instruction is intended for use when a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment dis-
crimination under the FEHA against an employer or other covered entity. Disparate treat-
ment occurs when an employer treats an individual less favorably than others because of
the individual’s protected status.”).
94. CAL. JURY INST. — CIVIL 12.01.1 (2010).





100. See id. at 54; Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a)
(2011).
101. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 54.
102. Id. at 55.
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the most narrow “but for” standard;103 second, the intermediate “sub-
stantial motivating factor” standard;104 and third, the most broad “mo-
tivating factor” standard.105 This third standard is what appellate
courts generally utilized before Harris.106
In deciding which standard to apply the court looked to FEHA’s
legislative history,107 judicial interpretation of “because of” as used in
Title VII,108 and the general history of Title VII jurisprudence.109 Af-
ter identifying the purposes of FEHA110 the court held a plaintiff must
prove that “discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic
was a substantial factor motivating the adverse employment action.”111
The court defended the “substantial motivating factor” standard
by refuting the need for the “but for” standard in light of the purposes
of FEHA.112 The court concluded that a standard less than “but for”
cause would more effectively achieve the goals of FEHA.113 The court
noted that “discrimination can be serious, consequential, and even by
itself determinative of an employment decision without also being a
‘but for’ cause.”114 When discrimination is shown to have played a
substantial motivating factor, “even if not a ‘but for’ cause of the dis-
puted employment action, [it] would breed discord and resentment
103. Id. at 54–55 (articulating the standard used in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S.
167, 176 (2009)).
104. Id. at 55 (using the standard adopted in In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1375 (Cal.
1995) to interpret “because of” in the California anti-hate crime statute as not requiring
that the “prohibited motivation be the predominant or exclusive clause of the offense.” In
re M.S., 896 P.2d at 1375.).
105. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 55 (noting that a broad reading of “because of” is supported
by the Fair Employment and Housing Commission’s long-standing construction of the
term “because of” and by Congress’s 1991 amendment to Title VII).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58. Compare CAL. CIV. JURY INSTR. NO. 2500, R
(Judicial Council of Cal. June 2013 Supp.), at 171 available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/
partners/documents/caci_supp_2013.pdf (listing as an essential element, in the June 2013
revision, that plaintiff’s protected status was a substantial motivating reason for the adverse
action), with CAL. CIV. JURY INSTR. NO. 2500 (Judicial Council of Cal. 2013), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/caci_2013_edition.pdf (listing as an essen-
tial element, in the June 2012 revision, that plaintiff’s protected status was only a motivat-
ing reason for the adverse action).
107. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 55 (noting that nothing bore on the degree of causation
required by FEHA).
108. Id. at 56–57.
109. Id. at 57–60.
110. Id. at 61 (identifying the purposes of FEHA as remedying and deterring unlawful
discrimination).
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. See id. at 63–65.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 64.
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in the workplace if allowed to be committed with impunity.”115 The
court could not attribute to the Legislature the “intent to deem lawful
any discriminatory conduct that is not the ‘but for’ cause of an adverse
employment action against a particular individual.”116
The court cited its reason for rejecting the “motivating factor”
standard by cautioning that FEHA does not prohibit “discriminatory
thoughts, beliefs, or stray remarks” unrelated to the employment deci-
sion, or discrimination “in the air.”117 To more effectively ensure lia-
bility does not attach to “mere thoughts or passing remarks,” the court
followed Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence and held
that plaintiffs should prove discrimination was a substantial motivating
factor, rather than simply a motivating factor.118
C. A Same-Decision Showing Eliminates Money Damages for
Employees
After articulating the standard of causation, the court was faced
with the question of whether to recognize a same-decision defense;
and if so, to determine whether it is a complete or partial bar to reme-
dies. Ultimately, the court held that an employer might mitigate, but
not avoid, liability if it shows by a preponderance of the evidence that
it would have made the same decision absent discrimination.119
The court first justified its decision to allow a same-decision de-
fense by noting that some courts of appeal “have suggested in dicta
and without analysis that mixed-motive cases should be analyzed
under the Price Waterhouse framework.”120 The court also cited Depart-
ment of Fair Employment Housing Commission v. Church’s Fried Chicken,
Inc.,121 which held that a same-decision showing, while not a complete
defense to liability, precludes certain remedies.122 The court high-
lighted that the purposes of FEHA are “to provide effective remedies
that will . . . redress the adverse effects of [discriminatory] practices
on aggrieved persons”123 and to deter and prevent unlawful employ-
115. Id.
116. Id. at 65.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 65–66.
119. Id. at 61, 64.
120. Id. at 60.
121. Church’s Fried Chicken, Inc., FEHC Dec. No. 90-11, 1990 WL 312878 (Cal.
F.E.H.C. Aug. 16, 1990).
122. See Harris II, 294 P.3d at 61.
123. Id. (alterations in original) (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920.5 (2006)).
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ment practices.124 The court then concluded these purposes would be
undermined if an employer could escape liability by merely proving it
would have made the same decision absent its substantial
discrimination.125
However, the court decided that awarding back pay or reinstate-
ment to an employee who would have suffered the adverse action any-
way would be an unjustified windfall to the employee and would
unfairly limit employers’ freedom of choice.126 The court also decided
noneconomic damages (such as emotional distress) are unjustified127
because, while discrimination is harmful, the real harm employees ex-
perience is from the termination and less from the unequal treat-
ment.128 The court again emphasized its desire to prevent the unjust
enrichment of aggrieved employees.129
The court decided employees who would have suffered the ad-
verse action absent discrimination are entitled to declaratory judg-
ment, reasonable attorney fees and costs, and injunctive relief for the
employer to cease its discriminatory practices.130
In sum, the court raises the standard of causation for plaintiffs in
mixed-motive cases and permits an employer to mitigate liability if it
shows it would have made the same decision absent discrimination.
Since the employer ostensibly would have made the same decision,
124. Id. (“[This goal is] rooted in the Legislature’s express recognition that employ-
ment discrimination ‘foments domestic strife and unrest, deprives the state of the fullest
utilization of its capacities for development and advancement, and substantially and ad-
versely affects the interests of employees, employers, and the public in general.’”).
125. Id. at 64.
[A]llowing a same-decision showing to immunize the employer from liability . . .
would tend to defeat the purposes of the FEHA. . . . [T]he existence of facts from
which a jury could find that improper bias was a substantial factor motivating the
employer’s decision is sufficient to establish discriminatory conduct . . . even if
not a “but for” cause of the disputed employment action, would breed discord
and resentment in the workplace if allowed to be committed with impunity.
Id.
126. Id. at 66 (“Although [reinstatement and back pay] might help to ‘prevent and
deter unlawful employment practices,’ they would do so only at the cost of awarding plain-
tiffs an unjustified windfall and unduly limiting the freedom of employers to make legiti-
mate employment decisions.”).
127. Id. at 66–67.
128. See id. at 67 (“When an employee is fired, and when discrimination has been
shown to be a substantial factor but not a ‘but for’ cause, we believe it is a fair supposition
that the primary reason for the discharged employee’s emotional distress is the discharge
itself.”).
129. Id. (“Such distress is not compensable under FEHA—indeed, compensation for
such distress would be a windfall to the employee—if the employer proves it would have
fired the employee anyway for lawful reasons.”).
130. Id. at 67–68.
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even had it not discriminated, employees may not seek back pay or
reinstatement. While acknowledging discrimination may be harmful
to employees, employees may not seek emotional distress damages
since the real harm is from the adverse action, not the discrimination.
III. Critical Race Perspective on Harris
The decision reflects an insider perspective by addressing the ap-
parent problem of an ineffective outsider employee successfully suing
her employer for unlawful discrimination. The existence of this prob-
lem depends on the accuracy of the assumption that outsiders unfairly
avail themselves of FEHA protections to excuse poor workplace per-
formance. Portions of the decision pertaining to remedies imply the
presence of this assumption.131 Whether or not the assumption is
true,132 Harris seems to be the perfect case in which to address an
outsider employee unfairly benefitting from FEHA, since the facts sug-
gest Harris was a reckless bus driver who got into accidents and exces-
sively missed work.
A closer look at the facts, however, paints a different picture of
Harris’s performance. This examination calls into serious question
whether Harris actually should have been analyzed as a mixed-motive
case, or whether it should have been analyzed under McDonnell Doug-
las. In any event, the court’s portrayal of the facts made possible a
mixed-motive analysis.
The decision further reflects an insider perspective when it dis-
cusses that unlawful discrimination may not be premised on stray re-
marks, by assuming that since discrimination is no longer prevalent,
claims of discrimination are likely to be false, unless proven by explicit
discrimination. The decision neglects the real personal impacts of dis-
crimination on outsiders, places the risk of wrong decisions on outsid-
ers, and favors a policy of preventing the unjust enrichment of
employees over giving a free pass to employers who discriminate.
A. To Support Its Holdings The Court Emphasized Facts
Beneficial to the City
One way the insider’s perspective manifested itself was in the
court’s emphasis of certain facts over others. The court’s recitation of
131. See discussion infra Part III.A.
132. The disproportionate lack of success enjoyed by plaintiffs in discrimination cases
suggests the assumption is not true. See Oppenheimer, supra note 22, at 566; Clermont &
Schwab, supra note 20, at 127.
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the facts portrayed Harris as an unqualified and irresponsible fe-
male—maybe of color—bus-driver.
In its description of the facts, the court begins by mentioning
Harris’s first “preventable accident” during her forty-day training pe-
riod.133 The court notes that she successfully passed her training pe-
riod and then shortly after had a second preventable accident in
which she “sideswiped a parked car and tore off its side mirror.”134
The court next alerts the reader to Harris’s two miss-outs135 and
points out the second one occurred because she took her daughter to
a juvenile court hearing.136 The court cites the job performance
guidelines that state a probationary employee is only allowed two miss-
outs.137 Transit Services Manager Bob Ayer investigated the circum-
stances surrounding the second miss-out and recommended the miss-
out not be excused.138 This is the extent of the court’s portrayal of the
facts surrounding the quality of Harris’s performance, and it suggests
the termination was warranted.
The court, however, omits facts relevant to her job performance,
and whether the City had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating her. The court omits that Harris was not reprimanded for
either accident.139 The court also omits that all of the employees who
worked with Harris and testified at trial said they had “no issue” with
her performance as a bus driver.140 As a matter of fact, the City’s pol-
icy was that a probationary employee must be involved in four pre-
ventable accidents to be subject to termination.141 Far from being an
irresponsible bus driver, the actual record suggests Harris was a better
driver than others who eventually passed their probationary period.142
As to the miss-outs as justification for Harris’s termination, the
court failed to mention that there were three different possible sets of
133. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 52.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting the job performance guidelines that define “a ‘miss-out’ as a driver’s





139. Brief for Respondent at 5, Harris I, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (No.
B199571), 2008 WL 5545094, at *5 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
140. Id. at 32.
141. See id. (“In fact, contrary to [the City’s] position on appeal, Harris’ [sic] supervisor
Sheila Terry testified at trial that a probationary employee must be involved in 4 preventa-
ble accidents to subject to termination.”).
142. See id.
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standards that governed the permissible number of miss-outs proba-
tionary employees could have before being subject to termination.
The Motor Coach Manual (distributed to all bus drivers) specified
drivers were subject to termination after the equivalent of four miss-
outs within a ninety-day period, or eleven miss-outs in a twelve-month
period.143 All city employees who testified at trial acknowledged the
Motor Coach Manual did not state that probationary employees were
permitted fewer miss-outs than full-time ones.144 The performance
guidelines, referenced by the court in its recitation of the facts, did
provide that probationary employees were permitted half of the de-
merit points (and thus half the amount of miss-outs) as full time
ones.145 The final standards concerning miss-outs probative to
whether Harris’s termination decision was race-neutral were the Crite-
ria for Probationary Termination created by Bob Ayer.146 The Criteria
provide a “probationary employee that receives 5 miss-outs” within a
year is subject to termination.147
The court also failed to mention the City should have—or at least
could have—excused the second miss-out,148 even though Harris’s su-
pervisor conceded at a deposition.149 While seemingly a minor detail,
the second miss-out was the stated justification for Harris’s termina-
tion150 and provided additional weight to the court’s image of a reck-
less and irresponsible bus driver undeserving of FEHA protections.
As a result of the selection of the facts included in the opinion,
the reader is left with an image of an accident-prone bus driver who
had two miss-outs, and these were the significant causes of her termi-
nation. On these facts, Harris’s employer was already going to termi-
nate her because of her incompetence and irresponsibility and not
necessarily her pregnancy, and the court makes her successful sex dis-
crimination claim in the lower courts appear unjust.
143. Id. at 12.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 13.
146. Id. at 14.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 21–22. Supervisor Reynoso testified at a deposition that, with the proper
documentation, the miss-out would have been excused, and Supervisor Gonzales testified at
a deposition that, with proper documentation, he would have had cause to excuse the miss-
out. Id. At trial, both Reynoso and Gonzales contradicted their earlier deposition testi-
mony. Id.
149. Id. at 21 (“[D]uring his pretrial deposition, Reynoso admitted under oath that if
proof of a court appearance was provided, then the miss out would have been removed.”).
150. Id. at 4 (“The City would later claim that Harris’ [sic] termination was justified
because she had accumulated too many ‘points’ (i.e., demerits) for ‘miss outs.’”).
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The overall purpose of the opinion’s portrayal of the facts is to
frame the discussion and the issues in the case. The problem posed is
determining what should be done when “a mix of discriminatory and
legitimate reasons [motivate] the employer’s decision?”151 For the
court to be able to address this issue it needed the employer to be
actually motivated by legitimate reasons. If there were not legitimate
reasons (along with discriminatory ones) for the adverse decision the
case would have been analyzed under McDonnell Douglas as a single-
motive case, and the instruction used by the trial court would have
been correct. While the case was not tried as one of mixed-motives,152
the court emphasized specific facts and omitted others to create the
impression the employer had legitimate reasons for terminating Har-
ris. This allowed the court to address the issues within a mixed-motive
framework.
The mixed-motive defense presents an appealing solution to the
perceived problem that minority employees will pull the discrimina-
tion card generally—or the race card specifically—without merit to
excuse their poor performance in the workplace. Professor Robinson
has observed, “[t]he notion that black people in particular imagine or
exaggerate instances of potential discrimination seems to have gained
traction in the popular culture.”153 One assumption underlying this
perceived problem is that minorities and women are less capable, less
intelligent, and weaker than their white male counterparts. “Rather
than genuinely but mistakenly perceiving discrimination as perva-
sive . . . those who play the race card are seen as deliberately and
dishonestly using race as an excuse for their own failings. Women are
at times subject to somewhat similar charges” from men.154
Harris presented facts that allowed the court to address the so-
called problem of minorities abusing discrimination laws. That this
perceived problem was a consideration of the court is implicit in its
discussion about remedies available to an employee who has been dis-
criminated against but against whom the employer made a same-deci-
151. Harris II, 294 P.3d 49, 54 (Cal. 2013).
152. The jury was read CACI Jury Instruction 2500, a standard disparate treatment in-
struction, which, in this case, only required that Harris’s pregnancy be “a motivating rea-
son/factor for [her] discharge.” Transcript of Jury Instructions/Charge to the Jury at
3095–96, Harris v. Santa Monica, No. BC341569, 2007 WL 4762069 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb.
23, 2007). “This instruction is intended for use when a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment
discrimination under the FEHA against an employer or other covered entity. Disparate
treatment occurs when an employer treats an individual less favorably than others because
of the individual’s protected status.” CAL. CIV. JURY INSTR. NO. 2500, supra note 93. R
153. Robinson, supra note 27, at 1139.
154. Id. at 1139–40.
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sion showing. The court addressed the concern of discrimination
plaintiffs unfairly and undeservedly benefiting from anti-discrimina-
tion laws by focusing on the aim of preventing an unjustified wind-
fall155 to aggrieved employees. Without permitting a same-decision
defense, the court would not have been able to address the problem
of letting employees unduly benefit from anti-discrimination laws.
And without characterizing Harris as a habitually late and dangerous
bus driver, the case would not have presented a same-decision
question.
B. The Court Opens the Door to a Broader Rejection of Strays in
the Future
Some jurisdictions have adopted the “stray remarks” doctrine to
discount or ignore proffered evidence of discrimination.156 Some
courts conclude that a stray remark is insufficiently related to the em-
ployment decision because it is either too isolated to be part of a
broader pattern of comments,157 insufficient in temporal proximity to
the adverse action,158 too ambiguous,159 or too contextually attenu-
ated160 from the adverse action. As a result, many courts categorically
“dismiss a remark offered as evidence of discriminatory intent as
‘stray’ before” holding at summary judgment that, as a matter of law,
no reasonable juror could find for the plaintiff.161
Merely two-and-a-half years earlier in Reid v. Google,162 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the stray remarks
doctrine at summary judgment. There, the court engaged in a thor-
155. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 67.
156. Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employ-
ment Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 159 (quoting Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1222 (1995)).
157. Id. (comparing Hunter v. Sec’y of U.S. Army, 565 F.3d 986, 997 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“[The] single, isolated remark, insulting as it may be, simply does not rise to the level of a
materially adverse employment action.”) with Hasham v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 200
F.3d 1035, 1050 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The remark is only but a part of a pattern of falsehoods,
contradictions, and discriminatory statements by [the decision maker] that, as a whole,
convincingly demonstrate intentional discrimination.”)).
158. Id. (citing Petts v. Rockledge Furniture L.L.C., 534 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2008)).
159. Id. (citing Douglas v. J.C. Penney Co., 474 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2007)).
160. Id. (citing Fjelsta v. Zogg Dermatology, P.L.C., 488 F.3d 804, 809–10 (8th Cir.
2007)).
161. Id. (citing Sandra F. Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability for Title
VII, 61 ALA. L. REV. 773, 791 (2010)).
162. Reid v. Google, Inc., 235 P.3d 988 (Cal. 2010).
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ough discussion of the doctrine and for a multitude of reasons,
soundly rejected it.163
Harris does not involve remarks that could be considered stray,
and the court does not engage in any such analysis. Despite this, it says
at three different points that stray remarks alone will not be sufficient
to show actionable discrimination under FEHA.164 Despite its men-
tion of stray remarks, the court fails to cite Reid.
The passing mention of stray remarks serves as a policy justifica-
tion for choosing the heightened standard of “substantial motivating
factor.”165 The mention of stray remarks might also establish the prin-
ciple that liability for discrimination will not be imposed based on evi-
dence of mere thoughts or passing statements unrelated to the
decision.166 This is a different principle than what was acknowledged
in Reid.
In Reid, the court acknowledged, even while rejecting the doc-
trine, that “a stray remark” or “a slur,” alone would be insufficient to
create a triable issue of fact at summary judgment.167 The fact that the
word “remark” is plural in Harris, yet singular in Reid, may be signifi-
cant. Whereas Reid seemed to clearly reject the notion that multiple
statements could be categorically excluded at summary judgment,168
Harris seems to breathe some life into this idea. Prior to Harris, a court
could not find two distant remarks insufficient to create a material
dispute of fact during its totality of the circumstances analysis169 at
summary judgment. Now, Harris has granted courts the authority to
163. Id. at 1008–11. The court rejected the doctrine because: (1) the task of weighing
ambiguous evidence is for the jury at trial, not the judge at summary judgment; (2) strict
application of the doctrine is contrary to procedural rules codified by statute at the sum-
mary judgment phase; (3) the doctrine does not add much more to the analysis since a
“slur, in and of itself, does not prove actionable discrimination;” (4) federal courts have
disagreed over how to define a “stray remark” and how close in time to the decision a
remark must be so that it is relevant; (5) federal courts have treated “identical remarks
inconsistently”; and (6) “the stray remarks doctrine contains a major flaw because discrimi-
natory remarks by a non-decision making employee can influence a decision maker.” Id.
164. See, e.g., Harris II, 294 P.3d 49, 61, 65 (Cal. 2013).
165. Id. at 66 (emphasis omitted) (“[The heightened standard] more effectively en-
sures that liability will not be imposed based on evidence of mere thoughts or passing
statements unrelated to the disputed employment decision.”).
166. Id.
167. Reid, 235 P.3d at 1008 (emphasis added).
168. See, e.g., MING W. CHIN ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: EMPLOYMENT LITIGA-
TION § 7:372 (Rutter Group 2012).
169. The totality of the circumstances analysis asks trial courts to “review and base its
summary judgment determination on the totality of evidence in the record, including any
relevant discriminatory remarks.” Reid, 235 P.3d at 1005. The Reid court rejected Google’s
argument that the stray remarks doctrine winnows out weak cases and concluded that the
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find even multiple remarks insufficient as a matter of law to find
discrimination.
Some courts may conclude the applicability of the stray remarks
doctrine to summary judgment is unchanged because Reid is not dis-
cussed in Harris, and Harris’s discussion pertained to a jury instruction
at trial.170 But even courts that do not believe Reid has been implicitly
modified and who continue to utilize the totality of the circumstances
test at summary judgment may use the principles in Harris to find, for
example, a statement that African Americans are “‘lazy, worthless, and
just [at work] to get paid’”171 was a mere passing remark. As such, no
reasonable juror could find the statement sufficient to show discrimi-
nation was a “substantial motivating factor” in the adverse employ-
ment decision because it was “unrelated to the . . . decision.”172 This
demonstrates the cumulative effect of the heightened causation stan-
dard and the principle that liability will not be imposed based on evi-
dence of mere thoughts or passing statements unrelated to the
decision.
Even if courts continued to use Reid to limit the applicability of
the doctrine at summary judgment, there is the real possibility courts
could permit the doctrine’s influence of a jury instruction at trial.173
The stray remarks doctrine itself is premised on the concept that
discrimination is absent in the workplace. To exclude a racist, sexist,
homophobic, or other derogatory slur as irrelevant or insufficient as a
matter of law to raise even an inference of discrimination is to assume
there is no discrimination in the first place. The use of the derogatory
term is an aberration and the exception to a normally nondiscrimina-
tory workplace. The doctrine reflects a perception of a colorblind and
post-racial society as opposed to one still battling with discrimination
and unequal opportunity.
The revival of stray remarks serves the function of further limiting
outsider employees’ ability to seek redress from the justice system.
The doctrine reflects a post-racial or colorblindness perspective,
which assumes race discrimination does not exist absent compelling
totality of the circumstances test is sufficient to weed out cases too weak to raise an infer-
ence of discrimination. Id. at 1008.
170. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 53.
171. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 156, at 162. R
172. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 66.
173. See Veronese v. Lucasfilm Ltd., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 41, 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (cit-
ing LeMons v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 582 P.2d 946, 949 (Cal. 1978)) (stating that an
instruction is correct if it is a correct statement of law, within the issues developed by the
evidence, and not likely to mislead a jury).
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evidence to the contrary.174 Again this aspect of the decision reflects
an insider’s perspective and assumes that since discrimination is not
prevalent, claims of discrimination are likely to be exaggerated or
false, unless proven by explicit discrimination.
C. The Court Places the Risk of Erroneous Judgments onto
Outsiders Instead of Employers
The court certainly engaged in a thorough examination of the
purposes of FEHA to reject the but-for causation standard. The court
did not consider the same reasoning when deciding whether to adopt
either the substantial motivating factor or motivating factor standard.
The court concluded that a standard less than but for cause
would more effectively achieve the goals of FEHA.175 The court noted
that “discrimination can be serious, consequential, and even by itself
determinative of an employment decision without also being a ‘but
for’ cause.”176 When discrimination is shown to have played a substan-
tial motivating factor, “even if not a ‘but for’ cause of the disputed
employment action, [it] would breed discord and resentment in the
workplace if allowed to be committed with impunity.”177 The court
could not attribute to the Legislature the “intent to deem lawful any
discriminatory conduct that is not the ‘but for’ cause of an adverse
employment action against a particular individual.”178
The court then rejected the motivating factor standard because a
substantial motivating factor standard “more effectively ensures that
liability will not be imposed based on evidence of mere thoughts or
passing statements unrelated to the disputed employment deci-
sion.”179 The court does not subject the substantial motivating factor
standard to the same careful analysis as it did to the but-for standard
but errs on the side of caution against allowing finding discrimination
based on passing statements or thoughts.180 In doing so, the court
reflects the perspective of the insider by placing the risk of an errone-
ous decision by a jury (or a court at summary judgment) on outsider
employees rather than employers. The court is more comfortable with
174. See Robinson, supra note 27, at 1117 (“[The colorblindness perspective] views dis-
crimination as an aberration from a colorblind norm . . . .”).
175. See Harris II, 294 P.3d at 61–62.
176. Id. at 64.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 65.
179. Id. at 66.
180. See id.
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a meritorious case of discrimination being thrown out than a finding
of discrimination based on mere thoughts or passing statements.
Placing the risk on employees may not be bad policy if there was a
widespread problem of runaway jury verdicts or highly disproportion-
ate success by discrimination plaintiffs. But this is not the reality for
plaintiffs in discrimination cases.181 And exercising caution by re-
jecting a motivating factor standard would be acceptable if the stan-
dard required almost nothing of plaintiffs. But the motivating factor
standard requires a showing that discrimination “move[d] the will and
induce[d] action even though other matters may have contributed to
the taking of the action.”182 The relatively low success by plaintiffs in
FEHA discrimination cases183 applying the motivating factor standard
further supports the proposition that the motivating factor standard
was not leading to problematic outcomes for employers and did not
require judicial change.
D. Some Outsiders Will Just Have to Accept Discrimination
The court used the term “unjustified windfall”184 to describe any
monetary compensation to plaintiffs when there is a finding the em-
ployer would have made the same decision absent discrimination.185
Since a same-decision showing is likely to be illusory,186 the term may
not accurately apply to economic damages. This is so even if a jury
finds the plaintiff would have been fired anyways and would have suf-
fered no lost income or other monetary loss because of discrimination.
As it applies to noneconomic damages, which can be ordered for pain
and suffering, the term especially lacks real applicability. Any conclu-
sion that awarding noneconomic damages would be an unjustified
windfall relies on two erroneous assumptions.
The first is that discrimination has an insignificant impact on out-
siders. The court ostensibly recognizes that discrimination has an im-
181. See Oppenheimer, supra note 22, at 566.
182. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 53 (internal quotations omitted).
183. See Oppenheimer, supra note 22, at 548–49.
184. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 66.
185. Id.
186. See infra Part IV.B. Since discrimination can impair an employee’s performance,
and because an employer’s perception and memory about that employee’s performance
will be influenced by his own biases and prejudices, the employer’s performance-based
justification for the adverse action cannot be separated from the effects of discrimination.
See infra text accompanying notes 226–229. Therefore, it is unlikely a finding that an ad- R
verse action would have occurred absent discrimination is reflective of reality. See id.
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pact on victims,187 but then states, “the primary reason for the
discharged employee’s emotional distress is the discharge itself.”188
And because the employee’s distress is not caused by the discrimina-
tion, but is caused primarily by the adverse action, such harm is not
compensable.189
This assumption ignores the pervasive nature and effects of dis-
crimination. For example, recent studies demonstrate African Ameri-
cans continue to experience high levels of discrimination in multiple
aspects of life.190 High levels of exposure to racial discrimination are
also experienced by over one-third of workers of color.191 Discrimina-
tion has negative impacts on physical and mental health. Research in-
dicates discrimination can lead to high blood pressure, elevated heart
rate, and increased cortisol excretion, resulting in health problems.192
“Empirical studies have also found significant links between self-re-
ported experiences of racial discrimination and negative mood, de-
pressive symptoms, feelings of hopelessness, anxiety, and
psychological distress.”193 Additionally, a recent study shows that
among Asian Americans, discrimination is associated with psychologi-
187. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 66 (“There is no question that an employment decision moti-
vated in substantial part by discrimination inflicts dignitary harm on the affected individ-
ual, even if the employer would have made the same decision in the absence of
discrimination.”).
188. Id. at 67.
189. Id.
190. Robert T. Carter & Thomas D. Scheuermann, Legal and Policy Standards for Address-
ing Workplace Racism: Employer Liability and Shared Responsibility for Race-Based Traumatic Stress,
12 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, CLASS 1, 7 (2012) (discussing a fifteen-year longitu-
dinal study finding that 89% of African Americans experience racial discrimination in one
of several life domains like school, work, housing, or medical care, and 34% in at least
three of those domains) (citing Luisa N. Borrell et al., Self-reported Racial Discrimination and
Substance Use in the Coronary Artery Risk Development in Adults (CARDIA) Study, 166 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1068 (2007)).
191. Id. at 7–8 (“[H]igh levels of exposure to racial discrimination was reported by
37% of the workers of Color, as compared to 10% of White workers. Among the workers of
Color, Black Americans reported the highest level of exposure at 44%.”) (citing Nancy
Krieger et al., Social Hazards on the Job: Workplace Abuse, Sexual Harassment, and Racial Discrim-
ination—A Study of Black, Latino and White Low-Income Women and Men Workers in the United
States, 36 INT’L J. HEALTH SERV. 51 (2006)).
192. Id. at 9 (“Researchers studying the physiological effects of discrimination have
explored these relationships within the context of stress, such that racial discrimination is
viewed as a form of stress that triggers physiological responses (e.g., elevated blood pres-
sure, heart rate, cortisol secretions), resulting in health-related problems.”) (citing Eliza-
beth A. Pascoe & Laura S. Richman, Perceived Discrimination and Health: A Meta-Analytic
Review, 135 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 531 (2009)).
193. Id. at 11 (citing Yin Paradies, A Systematic Review of Empirical Research on Self-reported
Racism and Health, 35 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 888, 894 (2006)).
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cal distress.194 The assumption that racial discrimination has only in-
significant effects is thus not supported by research.
The second assumption is that juries will be unable to distinguish
between the plaintiff’s emotional harm caused by discrimination and
the emotional harm caused by the adverse action.195 Yet, the court
ignores that it has permitted such parsing of a plaintiff’s mental state
in prior FEHA cases.196 Additionally, the Court does not doubt a jury’s
ability to parse the decision-making process of the defendant in deter-
mining whether it would have made the same decision absent discrim-
ination. While evaluating one’s emotional state is not necessarily the
same as evaluating one’s decision-making processes, both involve
drawing inferences about one’s mental state based on available evi-
dence. The court seems willing to give juries discretion to parse a
party’s mental state for the benefit of employers but not for
employees.
Even if awarding noneconomic damages to a plaintiff who would
have suffered the same adverse action absent discrimination consti-
tutes unjust enrichment, courts again adopt the perspective of the in-
sider. By favoring the policy of preventing unjust enrichment over the
policy of preventing unjust lack of accountability by the employer to
the employee, the court is implicitly favoring the perspective of—usu-
ally insider197—employers over outsider employees. While reasonable
attorney fees and costs may be awarded to the plaintiff’s attorneys,198
the actual employee receives no redress for emotional damage caused
by the wrongful discrimination because the employee was going to be
fired anyway.
194. Press Release, American Psych. Ass’n, Racial Discrimination Has Different Mental
Health Effects on Asians Depending on Ethnic Identity, Age and Birthplace, Study Shows
(May 8, 2008).
195. See Harris II, 294 P.3d 49, 67 (Cal. 2013) (“[I]t is unrealistic to ask the trier of fact
to parse the plaintiff’s past mental state so finely and to award only the quantum of dam-
ages that corresponds to the emotional distress resulting specifically from discrimination
rather than the termination itself if the employer makes a same-decision showing.”).
196. See Roby v. McKesson Corp., 219 P.3d 749, 759 (Cal. 2009) (“[T]he jury might
have reasonably found that each individual act of discrimination leading up to Roby’s ter-
mination inflicted a separate emotional injury, and it might have found likewise with re-
spect to each failure to accommodate her disability.”).
197. 2012 Job Patterns, supra note 15 (showing that—while making up 65% of private
sector employees—whites comprise 79% of first- or mid-level managers and 88% of execu-
tive- or senior-level officials and managers, and—while consisting of 35% of private sector
employees—minorities comprise of 21% of first- or mid-level managers and nearly 12% of
executive- or senior-level officials and managers).
198. Harris II, 294 P.3d at 68.
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Harris exhibits an insider’s perspective by emphasizing certain
facts over others, reintroducing the stray remarks doctrine, ignoring
the impacts of discrimination on outsiders, and favoring a policy of
preventing the unjust enrichment of employees over giving a free pass
to employers who discriminate.
IV. Harris Conflicts with Our Knowledge of Discrimination
and Impairs the Ability of FEHA to Achieve Its
Goals
The court was very careful to emphasize that an employer may
not avail itself of a same-decision defense by simply articulating a legit-
imate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action; the court,
therefore, crafted a decision that it felt would best reflect the intent of
the legislature. However, the decision is inconsistent with our knowl-
edge of discrimination and unintended consequences will flow from
Harris.
A. The Nature of Implicit Bias and Microaggressions Makes the
Same Decision Defense and the Stray Remarks Doctrine
Legal Fictions
The legitimacy of the same-decision defense depends on the ac-
curacy of two assumptions. The first is that the employer’s perception
of the employee’s performance is not impacted by the employer’s dis-
crimination. This is completely contrary to research that indicates a
discriminating employer’s perceptions about the quality of the em-
ployee’s work will be tainted by his own stereotypes and bias.199 For
example, a discriminating employer is more likely to recall200 specific
incidents that confirm stereotypes about the employee being lazy
rather than incidents in which the employee was productive. And
when the discriminating employer’s decision is not an obvious one,
but is instead based upon ambiguous information, “bias is ex-
pected.”201 Studies show some people adjust their decision-making cri-
teria to justify status-based discrimination; often without conscious
awareness they have deployed ostensibly legitimate criteria differently
199. Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Framework for Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79 U.
CIN. L. REV. 97, 105 (2010).
200. Id.
201. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to Unconscious
Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 MO. L. REV. 83, 101
(2008).
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\48-1\san104.txt unknown Seq: 28  3-JAN-14 14:44
138 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
for members of one status group than for members of another.202 The
employee’s performance itself was not influenced by the employer’s
discrimination. This assumption is quickly refuted by research sug-
gesting that when a decision maker has discriminated against an em-
ployee (a necessary prerequisite to a same-decision finding), the
discrimination is likely to affect the employee’s performance.203
The second assumption is the employee’s performance itself was
not influenced by the employer’s discrimination. This assumption is
seriously challenged by research suggesting that when a decision
maker has discriminated against an employee (a necessary prerequi-
site to a same-decision finding), the discrimination is likely to affect
the employee’s performance.204
Employee performance may additionally be impacted by the pres-
ence of microaggressions. These are “brief and commonplace daily
verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether intentional
or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative
racial slights and insults toward the target person or group.”205 One
form of microaggression includes microinsults.206 These include be-
haviors that are insensitive, rude, or inconsiderate of another’s iden-
tity,207and “tend to be subtle and may be unconscious and
unintentional, but nonetheless demean the target or their group.”208
202. Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 21 (2011).
203. See Robinson, supra note 27, at 1103 n.30 (describing the phenomenon of stereo-
type threat in which “implicit cognitive processes can lead members of disadvantaged
groups to underperform when cues remind them of their group identity”) (internal quota-
tions omitted); Qaisar Abbas et al., Gender Discrimination & Its Effect on Employee Performance/
Productivity, 1 INT’L J. HUMANITIES & SOC. SCI. 170, 175 (2011), available at http://www.
ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_1_No_15_Special_Issue_October_2011/20.pdf (“The human
resource managers should be careful while hiring & promotion of the employees and pro-
viding facilities to employees in order to avoid any geneder [sic] discrimination because it
has a direct relationship on employee productivity and which will reduce organizational
productivity.”).
204. See Robinson, supra note 27, at 1130 n.30 (describing the phenomenon of stereo-
type threat in which “implicit cognitive processes can lead members of disadvantaged
groups to underperform when cues remind them of their group identity”) (internal quota-
tions omitted); Abbas et al., supra note 203, at 175. R
205. Eden B. King et al., Discrimination in the 21st Century: Are Science and the Law Al-
igned?, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & LAW 54, 56 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).
206. The more severe “microassault” is the traditional overt discrimination such as the
use of racial epithets. See id. The less severe “microinvalidation” is characterized by behav-
ior that minimizes the psychological thoughts, feelings, or experiences of victims. See id.
(“An example of an MV might involve assuming that a woman wearing a hijab (headscarf)
is not an American and would need a visa to obtain a job, or to suggest that women claim-
ing gender discrimination are overreacting.”).
207. Id. at 56.
208. Id.
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For instance, one might tell a member of a “racial minority that [he
is] a ‘credit to [his] race’ or to mistake a person of color for a service
worker.”209Microinsults are the most common form of microaggres-
sions in the workplace and are interpreted by employees as discrimi-
nation.210 While the study of microaggressions is a more recent
development in discrimination law, the available research suggests
that the presence of microaggressions impairs relationships between
individuals, and in the employment context can lead to exhaustion
and stress,211 which is likely to impair performance.
It has become clear that even good-faith job-related reasons given
by a discriminating employer for an adverse action will be inextricably
intertwined with, and caused by, bias.212 In short, discrimination im-
pairs employees’ performance. Since a discriminating employer’s ap-
plication of criteria, as well as his perceptions and memory of the
employee’s performance will be influenced by his own biases and
prejudices, the discriminating employer’s legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory justification for the adverse action cannot itself be separated from
the effects of discrimination. Absent discrimination, the employee’s
performance would not have suffered from the discrimination, and
the employer would not have viewed the employee’s performance as
negatively.
The facts of Harris demonstrate how a same-decision defense
makes little sense in light of the nature of implicit bias. Wynonna Har-
ris is an African American woman; supervisor Bob Ayer is a Caucasian
man; and supervisor George Reynoso is a Hispanic man.213 Reynoso
was confronted with a situation in which the circumstances surround-
ing the decision of whether to excuse the miss-out were somewhat am-
biguous.214 Because of the ambiguous nature of the information with
which Reynoso was operating, it is more likely implicit bias would op-
erate.215 Reynoso’s comment,216 upon hearing the news that Harris
209. Id.
210. Id. at 66.
211. See id. at 57.
212. Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 96 (2011)
(“In some cases, the employer may be telling the truth about the reason for its actions, but
that truth may result from embedded discrimination.”).
213. Telephone Interview with Michael Nourmand, Attorney for Wynonna Harris,
Nourmand Law Firm (Apr. 5, 2013).
214. Brief for Respondent, supra note 139, at 21–22 (demonstrating that testimony at R
trial was contradictory about whether a miss-out could be excused for attending a court
appearance).
215. Research indicates that when a decision maker must rely on ambiguous informa-
tion in its decision, bias is more likely. Bodensteiner, supra note 201, at 101. R
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was pregnant, qualifies as either a microinsult or microinvalidation
since the comment at least minimized Harris’s experience and at most
was insensitive, rude, or inconsiderate of a her identity.217 Despite hav-
ing the discretion to excuse Harris’s absence, Reynoso decided not to
do so.218 The City then made the decision to fire her.
It is possible that Harris would not have had the second miss-out
if her supervisors were not prone to discriminate based on sex. The
fact that Reynoso was found to have discriminated based on sex at trial
suggests that he operates based on biased information processing and
could have certainly engaged in discriminatory behavior before.219
The idea of Harris missing work to accompany her daughter to a juve-
nile court hearing could have conjured up ideas of her traditional
mothering responsibilities interfering with her work responsibili-
ties.220 While it cannot be proven, it is possible that if Harris had been
a heterosexual man who attended his own divorce hearing but was so
distressed by the ruling—since his greedy ex-wife got everything221—
that he failed to call in, Reynoso would have been more sympathetic
and used his discretion to excuse the miss-out. Even if the decision to
terminate Harris was technically justifiable (at least according to one
set of workplace guidelines), we cannot say whether her record would
have contained the second-miss out absent discrimination based on
sex (and possibly race).
The argument that Reynoso and Ayers did not know about Har-
ris’s pregnancy at the moment of the decision to keep her miss-out in
her file, and therefore they did not discriminate against her based on
sex, misses the point. The sex discrimination found by the jury is at-
216. Harris II, 294 P.3d 49, 53 (Cal. 2013) (“Wow. Well, what are you going to do? How
far along are you?”).
217. See King et al., supra note 205, at 56. R
218. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 139, at 21 (highlighting Reynoso’s inconsis- R
tent testimony between trial and deposition regarding his discretion to excuse a miss out).
219. See Rich, supra note 202, at 13–14, 16 (stating that the origins of discriminatory R
behavior are grounded in biased information processing characterized by automatic, cate-
gory-based processes that operate without the individual’s conscious awareness); Boden-
steiner, supra note 201, at 100 (“[Biases] corrupt decision-making not at the moment of R
decision, but long before it, by distorting the interpretive framework through which deci-
sions are made.”).
220. See Rich, supra note 202, at 13 (“Once social categories such as race- and sex-based R
groups are assigned, individuals may be presumed to rely on group identification as a
source of information about individuals, causing the behavior of group members to be
perceived in stereotyped terms.”) (citations omitted).
221. See e.g., id.; Doulas Cooney, Why Do Divorce Laws Marginalize Men?, ASKMEN, http://
www.askmen.com/daily/austin_60/92_fashion_style.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (dis-
cussing phenomenon where women are more likely to win custody battles).
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tributable to express or implicit bias on the part of the decision mak-
ers. Since they had the propensity to interpret and make decisions
with bias, the decision to not excuse the miss-out, while having the
discretion to do so, could very well have been motivated by sex.222
Reynoso and Ayer at least had the discretion to—and may have
even been required to—excuse Harris’s absence.223 And maybe they
would have if Harris were not an African American woman. As demon-
strated, there was ambiguity surrounding whether Harris’s miss-out
should have been excused. As such, given that discrimination was
prone to occur,224 bias was more likely.225 Under these circumstances,
we cannot conclude that she would have been terminated absent dis-
crimination; such a conclusion is illusory.
The stray-remarks doctrine is similarly nonsensical in light of the
research on discrimination. The categorical exclusion of an incrimi-
nating statement by an employer because it is too temporally removed
from the decision fails to recognize such a statement in the past may
evince stereotypes or biases which influences decision-making226 in
the future. The origins of discriminatory behavior are in biased infor-
mation processing.227 Biases “corrupt decision-making not at the mo-
ment of decision, but long before it, by distorting the interpretive
framework through which decisions are made.”228 For example, a
manager with the authority to hire and fire used a racist slur in front
of, but not directly at, an employee who was a member of the racial
group that the slur targets. Can we really say that the manager’s deci-
222. See Rich, supra note 202, at 13–14, 16 (stating that the origins of discriminatory R
behavior are grounded in biased information processing characterized by automatic, cate-
gory-based processes that operate without the individual’s conscious awareness); Boden-
steiner, supra note 201, at 100 (“[Biases] corrupt decision-making not at the moment of R
decision, but long before it, by distorting the interpretive framework through which deci-
sions are made.”).
223. Rich, supra note 202, at 21–22; Brief for Respondent, supra note 139, at 21. Super- R
visor Reynoso testified at a deposition that, with the proper documentation, the miss-out
would have been excused. Brief for Respondent, supra note 139, at 17. Supervisor Gonzales R
testified at a deposition that, with proper documentation, he would have had cause to
excuse the miss-out. Id. At trial, both Reynoso and Gonzales contradicted their earlier dep-
osition testimony. Id.
224. As discussed, research suggests the origins of discriminatory behavior are
grounded in biased information processing. See supra text accompanying notes 216–219. If R
discrimination occurred later, it is likely that it also occurred before. See Rich, supra note
202, at 16. R
225. Bodensteiner, supra note 201, at 101 (summarizing research indicating that when R
a decision maker must rely on ambiguous information in its decision, bias is more likely).
226. See Pedersen, supra note 199, at 105. R
227. Rich, supra note 202, at 16. R
228. See Bodensteiner, supra note 201, at 100. R
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sion to fire that employee a year later could not have been based on
race because the comment occurred a year before the decision? That
“an otherwise revealing comment was made outside the particularized
timeframe or context does not necessarily weaken its probative value,
and even if it does, it [should] not necessarily cause the evidence to be
wholly discounted and prevented—along with the case—from ever
reaching a jury.”229
When a court decides a comment is stray because it was not made
by the decision maker, the court assumes the comment is not proba-
tive of the presence of a work environment that fosters discrimination.
The idea that “a single decision maker, or even a discrete group of
decision makers, is separable from the environment in which he, she,
or it operates, works, and forms opinions, is simplistic and one-dimen-
sional.”230 Certainly, a workplace culture that tolerates bigotry, abuse,
or prejudice may foster discrimination.231
B. Harris Takes Us Backwards In the Ability of FEHA to Achieve
Its Purposes
The most obvious consequence of Harris is that plaintiffs will have
a more difficult time proving discrimination because of the height-
ened evidentiary burden they now face at trial. Not surprisingly, em-
ployment attorneys from the defense bar are praising the decision as
one that will make it harder for employees to prove discrimination.232
This heightened standard will further disadvantage outsider employ-
ees.233 People of color and women, who fare even worse in race and
sex discrimination cases,234 will be especially affected.
229. Stone, supra note 156, at 183. R
230. Id. at 187.
231. Id. at 188.
232. See, e.g., Casandra Secord, Ruling in Harris v. City of Santa Monica Raises Bar for
Employees to Prove Discrimination Under FEHA, LABOR & EMP’T LAW BLOG (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://www.aalrremploymentlaw.com/ruling-in-harris-v-city-of-santa-monica-raises-bar-for-
employees-to-prove-discrimination-under-feha/; The California Supreme Court’s Opinion in
Harris v. City of Santa Monica on “Mixed Motive” Discrimination Cases is a Mixed Bag for Em-
ployers and Employees, MILLER LAW GROUP (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.millerlawgroup.com/
publications/alerts/Harris-v-City-of-Santa-Monica.html.
233. See Kaitlin Picco, Comment, The Mixed-Motive Mess: Defining and Applying a Mixed-
Motive Framework, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 461, 477 (2011) (citing Vivian Berger et al.,
Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 4 (2005)) (“Courts often use summary judgment to dispose of employ-
ment discrimination cases before the parties get before a jury. One study found that only
thirty-two to fifty-five percent of employment discrimination claims survive summary judg-
ment. Even the upper end of this range is disconcertingly low.”).
234. Oppenheimer, supra note 22, at 548–49.
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As a result of the higher burden, the goals of deterrence and
remediation of discrimination will be less served. Since it will be more
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail, fewer discrimination cases will be
filed. Many more victims of workplace discrimination will have to live
with the trauma and very real problems caused by discrimination235
without the benefit of legal recourse.
There will be less motivation for employers to address discrimina-
tion in the workplace. This decrease in motivation will make it less
likely discrimination will be effectively addressed in the workplace.
Much discrimination is caused in part by automatic information
processing and stereotypes over which we have little control.236 One
of the “practical lessons from the research on intent and ordinary bias
[is] that policymakers and managers need to facilitate . . . motivation,
to encourage decision-makers’ least biased evaluations of other peo-
ple.”237 With less motivation to address discrimination in the work-
place, employers will be less likely to do so.
Additionally, if courts decide to apply the mixed-motive frame-
work and heightened standard at summary judgment,238 there will be
more outcomes in favor of employers. Requiring sufficient evidence
to find a substantial motivating factor, instead of merely a motivating
factor, gives trial judges too much discretion to take the decision from
the jury and grant summary judgment to employers.239
V. California Legislature Should Amend FEHA
The Legislature should amend FEHA to explicitly state the moti-
vating factor standard of causation. This will more adequately serve
235. See id.
236. See supra Part IV.A.
237. Bodensteiner, supra note 201, at 105. R
238. See Lynne Bernabei & Lauren Mendonsa, Age Discrimination: The New Frontier for
Aging Boomers, A.L.I.-A.B.A. 485, 493–94 (2013) (noting a circuit split in interpreting Gross
v. FBL Financial Services as to whether plaintiffs must show that there exists a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether age was the but for cause of the adverse action instead of only
showing a material dispute over whether the employer’s purported reason was pretext for
improper discrimination).
239. It should be noted that although the Supreme Court heightened the standard of
cauasation in ADEA cases in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), state courts con-
tinue to interpret state discrimination law and ADEA to preserve age discrimination claims.
Nancy L. Zisk, What is Old is New Again: Understanding Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
and the Case Law that Has Saved Age Discrimination Law, 58 LOY. L. REV. 795, 810 (2012).
However, there is no guarantee that such a response will result in California appellate
courts. Even if appellate courts do similarly find ways to preserve discrimination claims
under FEHA, it makes little sense from a policy perspective to have a Supreme Court stan-
dard that is not followed by lower courts.
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the purposes of FEHA to remedy and prevent discrimination in the
workplace and will incentivize employers to work at eliminating dis-
crimination.240 It will also shift the focus of a disparate treatment in-
quiry to causation rather than on conscious motivation.241
The Legislature should also amend FEHA to reject the same-deci-
sion defense for the reasons mentioned previously.242 Under this
framework, courts could analyze the issue of multiple motivations for
a decision under the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test and
simply ask whether discrimination was a motivating factor for the ad-
verse action.
Eliminating the availability of the same-decision defense will not
prevent entities from terminating, demoting, or otherwise taking nec-
essary actions against ineffective or problematic employees. FEHA
does not prohibit entities from taking adverse actions against incom-
petent or ineffective employees. Instead, FEHA aims to prevent243 and
remedy244 unlawful discrimination in the workplace. Preventing em-
ployers from relying on a same-decision defense will motivate employ-
ers to take measures to prevent discrimination in their own
workplaces. Employers will be more likely to implement research-
based policies which will more accurately assess employees’ perform-
ance. Ultimately, better evaluative tools will improve the productivity
and effectiveness of an entity. Employers’ decision-making will be less
constrained by biases, prejudices, and discrimination. As opposed to,
“unduly limiting the freedom of employers to make legitimate em-
ployment decisions,”245 employers’ freedom to make legitimate em-
ployment decisions will be less limited, constrained, and restricted by
discrimination.
Lastly, the amendments should reject the stray remarks doctrine.
The Legislature should codify the principle that discriminatory state-
ments are always relevant evidence to the issue of discrimination re-
240. See Pedersen, supra note 199, at 149–50 (“[N]ot only will the motivating factor R
framework potentially result in more short-term victories for plaintiffs by allowing poten-
tially meritorious cases to surmount a summary judgment challenge, it will also have a
more lasting effect as it could prevent decision-makers from unwittingly basing their deci-
sions on unconscious bias by forcing them to examine their reasons ex ante.”).
241. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Ac-
count of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 127 (2003) (citing Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995)).
242. See supra Part III–IV.
243. Harris II, 294 P.3d 49, 61 (Cal. 2013).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 66.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\48-1\san104.txt unknown Seq: 35  3-JAN-14 14:44
Summer 2013] THROWN UNDER THE BUS: VICTIMS OF WORKPLACE 145
gardless of whether the decision maker made the statement and how
distant in time the statement was made. The probative value of such
evidence should be for the trier of fact and not dismissed at summary
judgment. This could be added to the evidence code, or simply added
to the Government Code with the rest of the amendments.
Conclusion
Racial discrimination continues to persist in the American work-
place. Yet, plaintiffs prevail less often in employment discrimination
cases than in other kinds of employment cases. The widespread no-
tion of colorblindness reflects and exacerbates the difficulty in prov-
ing discrimination cases. Harris exhibits assumptions common to
insiders and clashes with research on modern forms of discrimination.
The decision takes us backwards in our ability to effectively prevent
and remedy workplace discrimination and is inconsistent with our
knowledge of discrimination. Therefore, the California Legislature
should account for our knowledge about discrimination by amending
FEHA to restore the motivating factor standard, reject the stray re-
marks doctrine, and reject the same-decision defense. While such
amendments may not ultimately help Wynonna Harris prove sex dis-
crimination in her case, they would help courts more effectively pre-
vent and remedy employment discrimination, while incentivizing
employers to work harder to eliminate unlawful discrimination in the
workplace.
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